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Abstract McNie is a code-based public key encryption scheme submitted as
a candidate to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization [8].
In this paper, we present McNie2-Gabidulin, an improvement of McNie. By
using Gabidulin code, we eliminate the decoding failure, which is one of the
limitations of the McNie public key cryptosystem that uses LRPC codes. We
prove that this new cryptosystem is IND-CPA secure. Suggested parameters
are also given which provides low key sizes compared to other known code
based cryptosystems with zero decryption failure probability.
Keywords McNie · Gabidulin code · public key encryption
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010) 94B05 · 94A60
1 Introduction
McNie [8] is a code-based public key encryption (PKE) scheme based on the
McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. It was designed to be secure against
known structural attacks against code-based cryptosystems. A random genera-
tor matrix is used as part of the public key which does not give any information
on the private key. This random matrix is also used to mask the private key
so the result is a more random matrix, rather than a parity check matrix of
an equivalent code.
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However, Gaborit [9] suggested a message-recovery attack which reduced
the size of the random matrix. Based on this attack and an improvement of the
complexity of the ISD on rank-metric codes [2], the security level of McNie
decreased by almost a factor of 2. For example, the parameters submitted
using 4-quasi-cyclic LRPC codes for 128-bit security (NIST Category 1) can
be attacked using this improved ISD with a complexity of only around 298.
So a new set of parameters were suggested which resulted in larger public key
sizes. In addition, LRPC decoding is a probabilistic decoding algorithm and
hence, the original parameters suggested for McNie suffer from relatively high
decryption failure probability. Therefore, it is desirable to modify McNie in
order to avoid Gaborit’s message-recovery attack.
In [13], Lau, et al proposed the use of Gabidulin codes in the McNie PKE
setting in order to address the issue of decryption failure. Gabidulin codes are
rank metric codes that have good structures and an efficient decoding algo-
rithm with no decoding failure. Although the McEliece cryptosystem based
on Gabidulin codes is already broken by Overbeck [16], Lau, et al [13] showed
that Gabidulin codes are secure to use in the McNie setting. However, their
reparation is still vulnerable to the message recovery attack by Gaborit [9]. In
this paper, we propose a modification of McNie which we call McNie2, which
we will show to be just a generalization of McNie. We believe that this mod-
ification results in a much stronger security against known message-recovery
attacks including Gaborit’s attack. Moreover, McNie2 using Gabidulin code is
also shown to be secure against Overbeck’s attack. Furthermore, the suggested
theoretical parameters achieve the lowest known key sizes for code-based pub-
lic key cryptosystems without decryption failure probability.
This paper is organized as follows. We begin by discussing some preliminary
concepts in rank metric codes and in particular Gabidulin codes in Section 2.
Next, we introduce the McNie public key cryptosystem as it was originally
submitted to the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization and a
message recovery attack that compromises the security of the original proposed
parameters. In Section 4, we present McNie2, a reparation of McNie which
avoids the said message recovery attack. In this variant, we use Gabidulin
codes to take advantage of the zero-decoding failure probability. We also show
that this proposed system achieves IND-CPA security. We follow this with
our proposed parameter and compare it to the original proposed parameters.
Finally, we conclude with the advantages and some limitations of our new
proposed scheme.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we explain the necessary background for rank metric code and
Gabidulin code.
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2.1 Rank metric codes
We begin by defining the rank metric codes or simply, rank codes. Essentially,
rank codes are linear codes equipped with the rank metric, instead of the usual
Hamming metric. There are two representations of rank codes, as we will see
later, which are actually related. One of them was first introduced by Delsarte
in the matrix representation originally as a bilinear form [6]. The other, the
vector representation, was introduced by Gabidulin in his seminal paper [10].
Definition 1 Rank codes inmatrix representation are subsets of the normed
space {FN×nq , Rk} of N × n matrices over a finite (base) field Fq, where the
norm of a matrix M ∈ FN×nq is defined to be its algebraic rank Rk(M) over
Fq. The rank distance dR(M1,M2) between two matrices M1 and M2 is the
rank of their difference, i.e., dR(M1,M2) = Rk(M1−M2). The rank distance
of a matrix rank codeM⊂ FN×nq is defined as the minimal pairwise distance:
d(M) = d = min(Rk(Mi −Mj) : Mi,Mj ∈M, i 6= j).
Definition 2 Rank codes in vector representation are defined as subsets
of the normed n-dimensional space {Fn
qN
, Rk} of length n vectors over an
extension field FqN of Fq, where the norm of a vector v ∈ F
n
qN
is defined to
be the column rank Rk(v|Fq) of this vector over Fq, i.e., the maximal number
of coordinates of v which are linearly independent over the base field Fq. The
rank distance between two vectors v1, v2 is the column rank of their difference
Rk(v1 − v2|Fq). The rank distance of a vector rank code V ⊂ F
n
qN
is defined
as the minimal pairwise distance:
d(V) = d = min(Rk(vi − vj) : vi,vj ∈ V , i 6= j).
Notice that for a given basis β = {β1, β2, . . . , βN} of FqN over Fq, every
vector v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) ∈ F
n
qN
corresponds to a matrix v¯ whose ith column
consists of the coefficients when vi is written in terms of the basis β. Moreover,
Rk(v) = Rk(v¯) and this is independent of the chosen basis. Therefore, every
rank code C in vector representation can be expressed as a code in matrix
representation with respect to the basis β. Throughout the rest of this paper,
all rank codes being considered are in vector representation.
Another difference between rank codes and codes in the Hamming metric
is the definition of the support of a codeword.
Definition 3 Let x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ F
n
qN
be a vector of rank r. We denote
by E the Fq-sub vector space of FqN generated by the entries of x, i.e., E =
〈x1, x2, . . . , xn〉. The vector space E is called the support of x.
2.2 Gabidulin codes
Gabidulin codes are rank metric codes introduced in 1985 [10]. They are a
well-studied class of rank metric codes used for many applications. They are
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constructed from a set of linearly independent elements of Fqm used to form
a Moore matrix.
Let [i] := qi, the ith Frobenius power. Gabidulin codes are formally defined
as follows.
Definition 4 A matrix G ∈ Fk×nqm is called a Moore matrix if there exists an
element g = (g1, . . . , gn) ∈ F
n
qm such that G = (g
[i−1]
j )i,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
1 ≤ j ≤ n. If g has rank n, then the [n, k]-Gabidulin code Gab(g) over Fqm of
dimension k with generator vector g is the code generated by the matrix G.
That is, if g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) where g1, g2, . . . , gn are linearly independent,
then Gab(g) has the following generator matrix
G =


g1 g2 . . . gn
g
[1]
1 g
[1]
2 . . . g
[1]
n
.
..
.
..
.
..
.
..
g
[k−1]
1 g
[k−1]
2 . . . g
[k−1]
n


.
Gabidulin codes have an efficient decoding algorithm that has no prob-
ability of failure. This, together with the simplicity of the structure of the
generator matrix, makes it an attractive candidate for cryptographic use.
However, the structure of the generator matrix also makes it vulnerable to
attacks. The McEliece variant using Gabidulin codes was completely attacked
by Overbeck[16].
3 The McNie Public Key Encryption
McNie is one of the several code-based public key encryption schemes submit-
ted to the NIST post-quantum standardization [17]. It claims to be resistant
against known structural attacks by employing a randomly generated matrix
as part of the public key and also to mask the secret key. Any code with an effi-
cient decoding algorithm using the parity check matrix can be used for McNie.
In [8], a class of rank metric codes called quasi-cyclic low rank parity check
(LRPC) codes are used in McNie. These codes are often used in cryptographic
applications because of their simplicity and relatively no structure. However,
one drawback is that there is a non-zero probability that LRPC decoding will
fail. While it is not a big issue in cryptography as long as the failure probabil-
ity is negligible, it is still very much desirable to design a cryptosystem that
gives no decryption failure.
The general key generation, encryption and decryption steps for the McNie
public key encryption are described as follows.
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McNie Cryptosystem
Key Generation
Generate a random l× n generator matrix G′ for a code over over Fqm
Generate the parity check matrix H of an [n, k] linear code over Fqm with
an efficient decoding algorithm ΦH which can correct errors of (Hamming or
rank) weight up to r.
Construct random n×n permutation matrix P and (n−k)× (n−k) invertible
matrix S over Fqm .
Let F = G′P−1HTS.
– Secret key: (P,H, S, ΦH)
– Public key: (G′, F )
Encryption
The sender generates a random vector e of weight r. A message m is then
encrypted as Enc(m) = (c1, c2) where
c1 = mG
′ + e
c2 = mF
Decryption
Let the received ciphertext be y = (c1, c2). Compute
c1P
−1HT − c2S
−1 = eP−1HT .
Apply the decryption algorithm ΦH to obtain eP
−1 and multiply by P to get
the error vector e.
Finally, m is recovered by solving the system mG′ = c1 − e.
3.1 Gaborit’s message recovery attack
There is a message recovery attack proposed by Gaborit [9] on the McNie
cryptosystem that significantly reduced the security of the original suggested
parameters. Notice that if m = (m1,m2, . . . ,ml) and F is of full rank, then
we obtain n − k linear equations of the mi’s from c2 = mF . Hence, all the
coordinatesmi’s can be expressed in terms of some fixed l−(n−k) coordinates.
We can then rewrite c1 as c1 = m
′G′′+e where G′′ is of dimension l−(n−k).
So an attacker can use general (Hamming [5] or rank [2]) syndrome decoding
on a code of dimension l − (n− k) instead of a code of dimension l.
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4 McNie2 Public Key Encryption using Gabidulin code
McNie2-Gabidulin Cryptosystem
Key Generation
Generate a random vector u ∈ Fnqm and generate the l × n-partial circulant
matrix G′ from u.
LetH be a parity check matrix for a [2n−k, n]Gabidulin code C = Gab(g) over
Fqm generated by g such that H =
[
H1 H2
]
where H2 is an (n− k)× (n− k)
invertible matrix. Let ΦH be an efficient decoding algorithm for C using H ,
which can correct errors of weight up to r =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
.
Generate random n× n permutation matrix P .
Compute F = G′P−1HT1 (H
T
2 )
−1.
– Public Key: (G′, F )
– Secret Key: (P,H,ΦH)
Encryption
Generate random vectors e1 ∈ F
n
qm and e2 = F
n−k
qm such that e = (e1, e2) has
weight r. Compute
c1 = mG
′ + e1
c2 = mF + e2.
The message m ∈ Flqm is encrypted as Enc(m) = (c1, c2).
Decryption
Suppose the vector y = (c1, c2) is received. Compute
c1P
−1HT1 − c2H
T
2 = m1G
′P−1HT1 + e1P
−1HT1 −mG
′P−1HT1 (H
T
2 )
−1HT2
−e2H
T
2
= e1P
−1HT1 − e2H
T
2
= (e1P
−1,−e2)
[
HT1
HT2
]
= e′HT
Since e′ = (e1P
−1,−e2) is of weight r, the decoding algorithm ΦH can be
applied to obtain (e′
1
,−e2).
Apply the permutation P to e′
1
= e1P
−1 to obtain e1.
Finally, solve the system mG′ = c1 − e1 to recover m.
To avoid the attack mentioned on the previous section, we slightly modify
the encryption algorithm by introducing an error e2 on c2. As a consequence,
the decryption algorithm is also slightly modified. Furthermore, H which is
one of the secret keys is of the formH =
[
H1 H2
]
whereH2 is an (n−k)×(n−
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k) invertible matrix. Therefore, this algorithm includes Dual-Ouroboros [11]
where H = [H1 | In−k] with In−k is the identity matrix of order n−k. We call
this modified cryptosystem McNie2. Moreover, we employ Gabidulin codes to
eliminate the decoding failure, as Gabidulin codes have a known deterministic
decoding algorithm. We call this version McNie2-Gabidulin. The detailed key
generation, encryption and decryption steps are given.
4.1 Security reduction
Indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is usually de-
fined by a security game wherein an adversaryA chooses two plaintextsm0 and
m1 and sends them to the challenger who chooses b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts mb
into ciphertext c then returns c to A. The adversary wins if A outputs b′ = b.
The advantage of an adversary A is defined as AdvIND-CPAA (λ) = |Pr[b
′ =
b] − 12 |. A public-key encryption scheme is (t, ǫ)-IND-CPA secure if for any
probabilistic t-polynomial time adversary A, we have AdvIND-CPAA (λ) < ǫ.
In order to prove IND-CPA security of our proposed scheme, first consider
the following problems.
Problem 1. Given an l×n− k matrix F and a full rank l×n matrix G′, find
a permutation matrix P and a parity matrix H = [H1|H2] for a Gabidulin
code such that F = G′P−1HT1 (H
T
2 )
−1.
Problem 2. Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) [2]
Let H be an (n− k) × n matrix over Fqm with k ≤ n, s ∈ F
n−k
qm and r an
integer. Find x ∈ Fnqm such that the rank weight of x = r and Hx
T = s.
The first problem is a form of a matrix factorization problem. Problem 2
on the other hand is the rank metric version of the syndrome decoding (SD)
problem. The RSD problem is proven hard in [12] by a probabilistic reduction
to the SD problem, which is proven NP-hard [4].
Theorem 1 The McNie2-Gabidulin PKE is IND-CPA secure under the as-
sumption of Problems 1 and 2.
Proof First, notice that and adversary A breaks the scheme if he recovers the
message m from the public keys G′ and F and the ciphertexts c1 = mG
′+ e1
and c2 = mF + e2 or is able to obtain the secret keys. These are instances of
Problems 2 and 1, respectively.
We proceed with a series of games starting from an honest run of the
scheme to the case when the ciphertext and the keys are random. Let A be
a probabilistic polynomial time adversary to our scheme and consider the
following games.
G0: This game corresponds to an honest run of the scheme.
IfW0 is the event that A wins Game G0, then Adv
IND-CPA
A (λ) = |Pr[W0]−
1
2 |.
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G1: In this game we replace the matrices H1 and H2 by a random matrices H1
and H2 of the same sizes. This results to a random F .
If W1 is the event that A wins Game G1, then, under the assumption of
Problem 1, the two games G0 and G1 are indistinguishable with |Pr[W1]−
Pr[W0]| < ǫ1.
G2: In this game, we modify the previous game by picking random vectors
(s1, s2) to replace (c1, c2).
The adversary knows
[
s1
T
s2
T
]
=

G
′ F
I 0
0 I

 [m e1 e2 ]
We denote by W2 the event that A wins in Game G2. Since the syndrome
s =
[
s1
T
s2
T
]
is random, under the RSD (Problem 2) assumption, Games G2
and G1 are indistinguishable with |Pr[W2]− Pr[W1]| < ǫ2.
Now, since the ciphertext challenge is random, any adversary A has no
advantage, therefore Pr[W2] =
1
2 . Therefore, we have
AdvIND-CPAA (λ) = |Pr[W0]−
1
2
| = Pr[W0]− Pr[W2]|
= |Pr[W0]− Pr[W1]|+ |Pr[W1]− Pr[W2]|
< ǫ1 + ǫ2.
This shows that under the assumptions of Problem 1 and 2, McNie2-
Gabidulin is IND-CPA secure.
4.2 Practical Security
We discuss some known attacks and how they affect the security of McNie2-
Gabidulin.
1. Gaborit’s Attack. This attack mentioned in Section 3.1 can be avoided
in our proposed scheme because of the error e2 added to the ciphertext c2.
This way, it is not possible to rewrite c1 in the form mentioned in Section
3.1.
2. Key recovery attack. Lau, et al. [13] proposed a key recovery attack to
the McNie cryptosystem whenever the matrix P is taken to be the identity
matrix. In order to avoid this attack, we simply restrict take P to be
non-identity matrix so that F = G′P−1HT1 (H
T
2 )
−1 is a cubic multivariate
system of equations and thus have a large solving complexity. Moreover,
H is not a circulant LRPC matrix and therefore this attack fails in our
scheme.
3. Overbeck’s attack. In Overbeck’s attack [16] on Gpub = S(X |G)P where
S ∈ GLk(Fqm), X ∈ F
k×t1
qm , P ∈ GLn+t1(Fq), and G is a k × n Moore
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matrix. Consider the code C¯ generated by G¯T = (GTpub, . . . , (G
[n−k−1]
pub )
T ),
since G
[i]
pub = S
[i](X [i]|G[i])P , then ker(C¯) = n + t1 − 1. An alternative
column scrambler matrix P¯ over Fq could be computed, giving GpubP¯
−1 =
S(Z|G∗) where G∗ is a Moore matrix. It is easy to see that in our proposal,
F = G′P−1HT1 (H
T
2 )
−1. The presence of G′ gives an additional scrambling
effect to the matrix and thus Overbeck’s attack fails.
4. Direct attack on the message. An attacker can try to obtain the mes-
sage m by directly attacking the ciphertext. In the rank metric, these
attacks usually deploy the support of a codeword and apply a rank metric
version of the Information Set Decoding [3]. Recent improvement of this
attack is given in [2]. This uses the Fqm-linearity of the code to improve
complexity. The best strategy has complexity (n− k)3m3qr
(k+1)m
n
−m.
5 Suggested parameters
We present in Table 1 our suggested parameters for McNie2-Gabidulin for
different security levels based on recent known attacks on the RSD problem
[2]. The public key size, denoted PK, is (n+l(n−k))m8 log2(q) bytes while the
secret key size, denoted SK, is (n+(2n−k))m8 log2(q) bytes. The ciphertext size,
denoted CT, is (n+(n−k))m8 log2(q) bytes. Sec in Table 1 denotes the security
level in bits.
Table 1 Suggested parameters for McNie2-Gabidulin
Sec n k l q m r PK SK CT
128 24 12 22 2 41 6 1.476KB 0.308KB 0.185KB
192 32 16 24 2 53 8 2.756KB 0.530KB 0.318KB
256 36 18 29 2 59 9 4.116KB 0.664KB 0.399KB
Table 2 shows the key sizes for the suggested parameters for a version of
McNie using Gabidulin codes given in [13]. By comparing from Table 1, we can
see that McNie2-Gabidulin offers smaller public and private key sizes. This is
because McNie2-Gabidulin is resistant to Gaborit’s attack in Section 3.1 while
McNie-Gabidulin[13] needs to increase parameters to avoid Gaborit’s attack.
By using McNie2-Gabidulin, we have a gain of around 400 bytes for the 128
bit and 192 bit security levels, and around 600 bytes for the 256 bit security.
Moreover, in Table 3, for every given bit security level, we give the public
key sizes, in kilobytes, for different code-based public key cryptosystems with
no decryption failure. The values in column 3 are for the McNie version using
Gabidulin codes given in [13] (given in Table 2). Values appearing in the last
two columns are from variants of the McEliece PKE using QD-Goppa [15] and
Goppa codes [14], respectively.
The above table shows our proposed cryptosystem has the lowest public key
sizes. Although these key sizes are relatively higher than those of cryptosystems
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Table 2 Suggested parameters for McNie using Gabidulin codes [13]
Sec m n k l t1 t2 q PK SK CT
128 43 38 14 37 9 3 2 1.88KB 0.98KB 0.33KB
129 44 40 14 38 10 3 2 1.94KB 1.07KB 0.36KB
192 50 45 19 44 10 3 2 3.21KB 1.36KB 0.44KB
198 52 47 19 45 11 3 2 3.40KB 1.48KB 0.49KB
257 57 52 20 51 13 3 2 4.70KB 1.80KB 0.60KB
257 59 54 22 51 13 3 2 4.88KB 1.94KB 0.63KB
Table 3 Public key sizes (in kilobytes) of cryptosystems with no decoding failure probability
Security McNie2- McNie- McEliece
(bit) Gabidulin Gabidulin QD-Goppa Goppa
128 1.476 1.88 4.096 192.192
192 2.756 3.21 5.632 -
256 4.116 4.70 8.192 958.482
using LRPC codes (e.g. [1,7]), the codes have a probabilistic decoding and
thus cryptosystems based on LRPC codes have a non-zero decryption failure
probability. This gives McNie2-Gabidulin an advantage over other code-based
cryptosystems.
6 Conclusion
We proposed McNie2-Gabidulin, a modification of the McNie public key en-
cryption scheme that avoids the message recovery attack by Gaborit. We also
address one key issue in the design of McNie, the decoding failure probability,
by using Gabidulin codes. We showed that although the McEliece cryptosys-
tem using Gabidulin codes are already proven insecure, its use in the McNie2
cryptosystem avoids known attacks and is hence secure. We also obtain rela-
tively low key sizes of a few kilobytes. In fact, McNie2-Gabidulin has the lowest
key size among code-based public key cryptosystems with no decryption er-
ror. We believe that this makes our proposed scheme a promising candidate
for post-quantum cryptography.
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